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This article addresses the notion of reflexivity in international theory through an attempt 
to transcend the dichotomy between knowledge and judgement. It intends to demonstrate 
that neither “philosophical” nor “scientific” approaches to world politics can reconcile 
cognitive and evaluative claims, but that such an endeavour may be envisaged within a 
certain conception of knowledge, science and facts. A comparison of Morton Kaplan’s 
approach with Hans Morgenthau’s and Kenneth Waltz’s suggests what kind of 
theoretical alternatives can bring together these two seemingly incommensurable orders 
of discourse under a unified, foundationally reflexive epistemology. 
 
 
 
Introduction  
 
The Reflexive Challenge 
 
The distinction between knowing and judging, or cognitive and evaluative 
discourse, has impressed International Relations (IR) theory for several decades, along 
with other related dichotomies such as facts vs. values and science vs. philosophy1. These 
dichotomies have become signposts announcing a parting of the ways leading to what 
appears to be different – if not opposite – intellectual investigations, whereby different 
purposes are sought, different questions asked, and altogether different realities 
examined. While disagreements over issues of purpose, epistemology, and ontology still 
fuel much of disciplinary debates, it is reasonable to consider that the growth of (various 
forms of) Constructivism has made some assertions less controversial or marginal than 
they once were. Today, indeed, more than a minority of scholars acknowledge the part 
individual and collective judgments, valuations, and perceptions play in the construction 
of at least some aspects of reality. What still needs to be addressed conclusively, 
however, is the properly epistemological question resulting from the impact such ‘facts’ 
have on the production of theory itself. In light of the general disenchantment with 
‘value-freedom’, how, for instance, can political and international theory successfully 
transcend its dual relation to the political as a reality that it needs to objectify according 
to the ethos of ‘ethical neutrality’i, while it is itself partly the product of internalized 
political, economic, and cultural relations of power?ii By definition, this and other similar 
questions put the subject in a reflexive posture that aims at questioning the necessarily 
reflective nature of thought and actioniii. For if evaluation is part of the construction and 
                                                       
1 I am grateful to Jennifer Sterling-Folker, Stefano Guzzini, and the anonymous colleagues who reviewed 
the article, for their invaluable comments and suggestions.  
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formulation of knowledge, then the distinction between cognitive and evaluative 
discourse can no longer hold, just as the positivist separation between the knowing 
subject and the object-to-be-known becomes illusory. 
The underlying principle of this article is that reflexivity is not and should not be 
considered a marginal or independent theoretical concern, but should rather be viewed as 
a foundational intellectual and epistemic posture made necessary by the 
acknowledgement of the ontological unity of subject and object, that elevates the 
problematique of knowledge to a new level of questioning, best described by Pierre 
Bourdieu as the ‘objectification of the objectifying subject’iv. Consequently, it is 
suggested here that the reflexive endeavour can only be successful if reflexivity is an 
intrinsic quality of theory, not a post hoc or parallel concern running alongside it: the 
reflexive voice is one by definition, and should therefore bring together the reflective 
subject with his hypothetical or real critic. For this reason, reflexivity cannot be born out 
of the confrontation between objectivist and critical theorists, since the latter 
unambiguously consider and treat the former’s discourse as their subject-matter, and can 
therefore logically neither grant nor be granted by them an equal degree of legitimacy. In 
the absence of such a mutual epistemic recognition, there can be no intersubjective 
agreement, without which deconstruction remains a unilateral, and therefore sterile, 
endeavour. The challenge, then, is to formulate a theory of international politics that can 
effectively reconcile these two orders of discourse under a common epistemology that is 
capable of addressing both positivist theorists’ concern for explanation and critical 
theorists’ concern for meta-explanation, by transcending the dichotomy between 
‘problem-solving’ and ‘critical’v or ‘explanatory’ and ‘constitutive’ theoryvi. 
Within the general preoccupations raised by some critical theoristsvii, and more 
specific ones that were recently voiced by scholars of different orientationsviii, this article 
attempts to identify possible features of such a reflexive theory that would allow 
scholarship to efficiently objectify its own production as an integral part of IR’s subject-
matter, and eventually ‘delineate […] a research program’ that would make post-
positivist theorists not merely more ‘visible’ to the ‘preponderance of empirical 
researchers’ in the fieldix, but likely to impose themselves as efficient intellectual 
alternatives. The purpose is to show that we can envisage theoretical frameworks that can 
reconcile cognitive and evaluative discourse in a way that is neither illusory as to the 
pretence of science or the scholar’s interested position – whether cultural, ethical or 
normativex – nor impervious to ideological manipulationxi; and to demonstrate that what 
makes a theory of IR successful in bridging the gap between objectivist and critical 
theory is its ability to address values and valuations as facts, and to make them a part of 
its ontology.  
 
Three Realisms 
 
Since the purpose of the following meta-theoretical demonstration is, firstly, to 
illustrate the dichotomous relationship between the ideal-types of cognitive and 
evaluative discourse and their equal failure to achieve reflexive thought, and secondly, to 
illustrate how they can come together under one reflexive epistemology, it is necessary to 
refer to specific theoretical frameworks. The three theories here considered, namely, 
Morgenthau’s, Waltz’s, and Kaplan’s, offer a good material for the present endeavour, 
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for they share enough common denominators to sustain a meaningful comparison of their 
differences: the commitment to an objective understanding of international behaviour; a 
conceptualisation of the “international system” as the common environment of 
international actors; the acceptance of states as the most significant, unit-actors of the 
system; the crystallization of power as the central reality/concept of IR, in addition to an 
equal interest in the balance-of-power as the most prevalent, actual mechanism of state 
interaction. If one is willing, for the purpose at hand, to ignore the contending definitions 
and interpretations of what Realism is, these common features, as well as the 
paradigmatic importance of Realism, should be sufficient grounds to justify the a priori 
significance and feasibility of the comparison. As for its relevance, it is justified by the 
fact that as far as the relationship between cognitive and evaluative discourse is 
concerned, these theories represent three different theoretical models, that will be termed 
respectively the “philosophical”, the “scientific”, and the “sociological”. Since any 
typology emanates from a specific classificatory purpose, these terms are meant to 
illustrate the differences that are specifically relevant to the question this article poses. 
Therefore, and for want of a better classification that would convey with clarity and 
comprehensiveness the relationships among these different approaches, as well as their 
internal complexities and richness, this typology will be used here despite the 
simplifications it impliesxii. 
Accordingly, the philosophy vs. science dichotomy is not meant to grant Waltz’s 
theory and deny Morgenthau’s a certain cognitive legitimacy, nor imply that they are not 
equally committed to “science”. Because the present focus is on the articulation of 
knowledge and judgment, this dichotomy is more appropriate to qualify the following 
contrast: while in the “philosophical” model evaluation precedes, informs, and shapes 
knowledge-claims about social reality, the cognitive discourse produced by the 
“scientific” model reflects a self-sustained, value-independent mode of inquiry. Against 
these dichotomous approaches, Kaplan’s systems theory is qualified as “sociological” 
because of its concern with process, not merely at the ontological level (process as 
opposed to being or structure), but more importantly at the epistemological level: by 
acknowledging the impact of valuations on the construction of scientific knowledge, 
Kaplan’s approach introduces a dynamic, self-corrective understanding of theory and 
theory-building, whereby cognitive and evaluative discourse can be viewed as mutually 
informing and reassessing each other.  
As these theories represent three different articulations of cognition and judgment, 
the comparison of their respective epistemologies is informative and useful to understand 
the conditions under which an alignment of these two orders of discourse is possible – 
and it incidentally highlights the fact that it is not the content of Realist claims that is 
impervious to reflexivity, but the epistemic assumptions of specific Realist theories (and 
hence, of some non-Realist theories as well). Each of these contributions will therefore be 
addressed with a specific focus on its philosophy of knowledge, the status it assigns to 
values, and whether/how it makes room for reflexivity. The comparison of Morgenthau’s 
and Waltz’s approaches shows that neither philosophical nor scientific models can 
successfully or consistently produce a reflexive discourse in IR, and makes it possible to 
reassess Kaplan’s attempt at formulating a comprehensive theory of the social: one that is 
capable of objectifying judgment as both a subject-matter of science and a factor shaping 
scientific production, and in which world politics and the discourse on world politics can 
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be simultaneously addressed as interdependent, and hence equally significant, objects of 
IR.  
 
Theory as Moral Practice:  
Hans Morgenthau and the Political 
 
Morgenthau’s contribution to IR theory has been so important in the institution of 
the field and its main “paradigm” that it still constitutes a major reference for IR students. 
It is, however, symptomatic of the discipline’s own evolution that such a pioneer should 
first be hailed for the “scientific” value of his approach, and be later on criticized by the 
inheritors of a more acute scientific awareness, that was meant to ‘transcend the error and 
confusion born of an early (and thus imperfect) apprehension of [the] evolving science’xiii 
of IR. A contextual reading of the disciplinary value of Morgenthau’s realism reveals its 
changing status in the fieldxiv. First considered the founder of a scientific study of 
international politics, his work then becomes ambiguous in light of new conceptions of 
scientific validity, appearing to be both ‘philosophical and empirical’xv, until the latter 
qualification is used by some proponents of positivismxvi to disqualify it, thereby 
rejecting it outside of “legitimate” scientific discourse altogether. These diverse 
interpretations obviously result from profoundly divergent assumptions regarding science 
itself, as well as the many struggles for academic legitimacy that are naturally served by 
such debates. It is nonetheless true that Morgenthau’s work can be assessed in different 
ways. The “philosophical” model proposed here is not meant to reduce it to a single 
dimension, but to signify that as far as the articulation between knowledge and judgment 
is concerned, Morgenthau’s cognitive discourse is informed and shaped by an evaluative 
one. In other words, judgment, values and valuation precede knowledge, facts and 
explanation in the logical and intellectual construction of his theory. 
 
Epistemic Scepticism: 
Morgenthau’s Critique of Apolitical Knowledge 
 
That evaluation comes first in Morgenthau’s Realist appraisal of social reality is 
obvious in the author’s perception of power and the political in general. Judgment 
precedes knowledge logically in the reader’s appreciation of his account, just as it 
precedes it in his own intellectual development. And just as it is misleading to read 
Politics Among Nationsxvii before – or without – reading Scientific Man Versus Power 
Politicsxviii, it is misleading to assess Morgenthau’s conception of knowledge, science, 
and theory without first discussing his conception of human nature, power, and the 
political. The fact that the political is defined in reference to an immutable and universal 
human instinct he calls the ‘will to power’xix is a foundational element of Morgenthau’s 
epistemology, one that also shapes his understanding of human action and his assessment 
of its potential outcomes. The political is thus defined in such a way that it encompasses 
all dimensions of social life, and power is found in everything that involves man’s 
thought and action, including knowledge and science as such, which suggests that the 
production of scientific truths is considered as a truly political phenomenon. It follows 
from Morgenthau’s perspective that any epistemology that rests on an a priori separation 
of the faculties of thought, judgment, and the will is self-deceptive, as it creates the 
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illusion that objective knowledge is a built-in feature of mankind that allows the subject 
to address his object of inquiry independently of his own nature and existence. Against 
the propositions of liberal-rationalism, Morgenthau’s Realism rests on a fundamental 
cognitive scepticism that views human knowledge as an inherent moral and political 
problem that cannot be reduced to, or equated with, the logical or material limitations of 
scientific investigation. By embracing this view, Morgenthau does not only express his 
scepticism towards a value-free science of politics, but also acknowledges the contextual 
nature and significance of any cognitive endeavour. In other words, political theory is not 
simply dedicated to the study of power in general, but is committed to revealing the 
manifestations of power where and when they are least visible. This specifically moral 
stand that denotes an ethics of social responsibilityxx clearly shows that Morgenthau’s 
objectification of the social world is intrinsically committed to reflexivity, or, as Murielle 
Cozette recently argued, that his Realism can be viewed as essentially ‘critical’xxi. 
It is, then, Morgenthau’s philosophical, a priori assumptions about human nature 
that inform his conception of the nature – and role – of scientific knowledge, and his 
epistemology is thus inevitably directed against the legitimacy and realism of scientist 
and positivist theories of the social. In order to embrace ‘science’ as a cautious 
rationalization of human behaviour that is conscious of the epistemic and moral 
limitations of thought, one has to abandon the illusory faith in pure, absolute reason, and 
accept the fact that reason is always ‘irrationally’ and ‘socially determined’xxii by both 
‘natural’ and ‘social forces’ that shape our behaviour and cognitive relation to the world. 
This ‘determination’ makes all science conditioned, limited, unable to extend its reign to 
all cognitive realms, and thereby forced to eternally coexist with other forms of 
knowledge, such as ‘religion, philosophy and art’xxiii. While Morgenthau’s rejection of 
scientism is based on a rejection of the analogy between nature and society, his position 
is asserted with regards to natural and social science alike, for he considers that nature 
itself, ‘as the object of human knowledge, is […] somehow the product of human 
action’xxiv. This quasi-constructivist stand, however, finds its deeper significance in the 
realm of social science, where ‘the social scientist as such stands in the stream of social 
causation as an acting and reacting agent’, for ‘what he sees and what he does not see are 
determined by his position in those streams’, and therefore, ‘by revealing what he sees in 
terms of his science he directly intervenes in the social process’xxv. From this perspective, 
scientism and positivism are rejected on the basis of two natural and intrinsic flaws: the 
first one concerns reason itself, which cannot be detached from man’s ‘biological and 
spiritual’ impulses, and can therefore never constitute an absolute tool whereby the 
external world can be universally assessed and measured; the second one concerns 
science in general, and social science in particular, which cannot be detached from the 
overall processes of existence that determine its very raison d’être. It follows that,  
since there exists a necessary correlation between the quality of the human 
mind, one the one hand, and the quality of the physical and social world, 
as we know it, on the other, the irrationality of human action cannot but be 
reflected in nature and society and in our knowledge of themxxvi, 
and that ‘socially useful reason is socially determined reason’xxvii. Undeniably, these 
propositions imply a genuine awareness of the need for reflexive thought. Morgenthau’s 
reflexive commitment is, however, only achieved at the individual, intimate level of the 
private ethics of the observer and interpreter of social reality. While it expresses a 
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genuine dedication to the “ethos of reflexivity”, his critical stand does not offer a 
foundation for an actual reflexive epistemology. 
 
Reflexivity as an Ethos: 
The Inconclusiveness of Morgenthau’s Critical Stand 
 
Morgenthau’s philosophical contribution to the post-war critique of liberal 
political thought was in bringing back the ‘tragic’ as an intrinsic feature of the human 
condition, one that concerns man as a social and knowing agent. In this sense, his 
definition and assessment of the scope of the political establishes a strong, reflexive ethos 
for the scholar whose task is to objectify political reality. The nature of human thought 
and action as qualified by Morgenthau defines the scholar’s subject-matter and his 
science together at once. This is so because the political scientist shares with his object of 
study the same ‘corrupt’ essence and is, like any other man, ‘a political animal by nature’, 
driven by the same ‘evil’ that manifests itself in all social action, of which political action 
is the ‘prototype’xxviii: the impulse for power that moves all men to use other men as 
means to their ends. The other common characteristic between ‘scientific’ and ‘political’ 
man is that both of them are ‘moral beings’ who ‘reflect and render judgments on [the] 
nature and value [of the social world] and on the nature and value of [their] social actions 
and of [their] existence in society’xxix. The political scientist’s cognitive relation to 
politics is therefore fundamentally based on this common and universal nature that makes 
it impossible for scientific knowledge to be either natural or spontaneous, purely 
objective or absolute: power is therefore the central concept that shapes both the political 
and the scientific realm.  
What distinguishes, then, the scholar from his subject-matter is a motivation for 
‘truth’ rather than ‘power’, a Weberian distinctionxxx that Morgenthau poses as the 
essence of political science, as an existential choice that is meant to help it face its 
necessarily political nature. ‘Scientific man’ is not merely concerned with the search for 
truth, but committed to saying truth against power – against its manifestations and 
ideological appearances. This commitment springs from Morgenthau’s belief that all 
political action is a ‘struggle for power’ having the tendency to hide the true nature of its 
motives and objectives behind moral claims. While the fact that ‘morality serves interest 
and power as their ideological justification’ is true for all politics, ‘this ideological 
function […] has become morality’s main function’ in international politicsxxxi, and this 
fundamental characteristic of the political world determines the role of political theory in 
general, that of international theory in particular. The commitment to truth that defines 
the scholar’s intellectual activity is therefore manifested as a properly social role, which 
explains why ‘the ultimate decisions which confront the scientific mind are not 
intellectual but moral in nature’xxxii.  
Morgenthau’s political theory is undoubtedly rooted in an axiological conception 
of science and the social world. It is, then, not surprising to find in his theory of 
international politics a treatment of values and normsxxxiii. This is possible because his 
central, unifying concept of “power” is not defined in a purely materialist way, even 
when it comes to state relations. Within his own epistemic perspective, the treatment of 
social values and norms can never be eliminated from political and international theory, 
not only because values and norms are ontologically part of its subject-matter, but also 
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because they constitute the basis on which theory defines itself against – i.e., as 
discriminated from – its subject-matter. What remains, then, is an eternal existential 
commitment that can never completely achieve itself and has to be dealt with, over and 
again, by the individual scholar, in his own ‘personal equation’xxxiv where his dedication 
to science and truth must constantly be asserted, and where the effort to ‘reconcile his 
political nature with his moral destiny’ can never be abandoned. Insofar as ‘one of the 
main purposes of society is to conceal [the] truths [about power] from its members’, a 
political science ‘which is faithful to its commitment of telling the truth about the 
political world’ can never gain social respectability, and it is therefore in its own 
unpopularity that it finds the indicator of its successxxxv.  
The “philosophical” dimension and value-laden assumptions that are the raison 
d’être of Morgenthau’s intellectual engagement were challenged by the “scientific” turn 
in IR. His concept of the political and his definition of power have been the main targets 
of his critics since the 1960s. What remains of these criticisms can be assessed in light of 
the general divide that segregates philosophy from science in the investigation of world 
politics. It is indeed difficult to embrace the rigorous standards of scientific 
conceptualization and validity, which are thought to guarantee the establishment of a 
“value-free” science of politics, and to accept the idea that ‘Morgenthau’s conception of 
“politics” is not […] just an analytic device’, but ‘a moral and political project’xxxvi. Even 
those most willing to acknowledge that ‘all social life is […] power’ have argued against 
the analytical relevance of this concept, on the basis that it makes Morgenthau’s 
propositions unfalsifiable, thereby disqualifying them as ‘scientific hypotheses’xxxvii. 
More generally, the reliance on an ambiguous concept of power posed as both the means 
of political action and its end, and on an obscure, a priori notion of an immutable ‘human 
nature’ that is meant to explain everything, is said to empty explanation of its purpose, 
according to a formally “rigorous” – Popperian – conception of scientific demonstration. 
Although I do not share all of these criticisms – most of which are grounded in 
epistemic assumptions that are incompatible with Morgenthau’s original concern – I 
believe nonetheless that while Morgenthau’s approach is successful in identifying 
Realism’s reflexive challenge – because it acknowledges its political nature and its 
relevance to scholarship – it, however, fails to answer it conclusively. Firstly, because it 
does not offer any empirical framework to evaluate and test the scholar’s relation to 
power. Morgenthau’s reflexive discourse is limited to the a priori identification of (the 
role of) valuations, and these are not actually or systematically treated as empirical, 
testable variables involved in social and cognitive processes. As a result of their non-
empirical status, Morgenthau’s assertions about the role of scholarship also reduce social 
and moral accountability to the scholar’s own individual subjectivity, whereby she is 
ultimately free to determine whether she achieved her moral commitment, and to justify 
her actions from her individual perspective. Epistemic reflexivity, on the other hand, 
requires an instrument of measure that is more substantial than the scholar’s own 
“conscience”, which Morgenthau himself would not trust: it requires, more specifically, 
the empirical objectification of valuations as both causes and effects of social interaction. 
Morgenthau’s “philosophical” approach can therefore not offer a sociological assessment 
of the impact of values on theory, because it addresses the problem as an individual, not a 
collective phenomenon, that is left to accompany and “contain” the objectification of 
world politics, instead of being an integral part of it. For these reasons, and unless men 
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can be magically made to agree over the content of some universal a priori principles, the 
“philosophical” model cannot produce a truly reflexive epistemology. It can, at most, 
produce the kind of reflexive ethos of which Morgenthau himself was a sincere – and 
perhaps misunderstood – representative.  
 
Kenneth Waltz:  
Realism as Axiological Scepticism  
 
At the other end of Realist IR’s spectrum stands a contribution that belongs to 
another intellectual/historical/institutional moment, manifested by the reformulation of 
Realism’s objectivity on the basis of the new epistemological divide between 
understanding and explaining. As an inheritor of the “scientific” orientation, Waltz 
appropriated the terms of IR’s ‘second debate’ and pursued the search for value-freedom 
into the heart of the 1970s, when new challenges forced Realism to reassert and re-
demonstrate its intellectual and institutional legitimacy. Explanation became a priority, 
and Waltz’s ‘Copernican Revolution’xxxviii  intended to achieve it at the necessary price. 
By qualifying his contribution as “scientific”, this article acknowledges Waltz’s success 
in producing a value-free theory of world politics that satisfies the requirements of a 
positivistic analysis of a specific social realm. The point is precisely to show that 
positivism and reflexivity are incommensurable epistemic attitudes. In opposition to 
Morgenthau’s intellectual posture in which evaluation precedes, and therefore, shapes 
explanation, Waltz’s posture starts with a concern for explanation, and any evaluation 
that might appear in his cognitive discourse is both secondary to it and detached from it.  
 
Explanation and the Standards of Science: 
Waltz’s Positivist Stand 
 
Moving from the epistemological to the ontological level, Waltz’s theoretical 
framework can best be summarized in the following three main premises, which together 
illustrate the author’s commitment to science-as-explanation. The first is that the true 
function of theory is to explain ‘observed’, factual correlations or ‘laws’; a theory is 
therefore neither true nor false, and should be judged, not by its realism, but its utilityxxxix, 
which lies in its ‘explanatory power’, that is, its ability to say why given causes will 
produce given effects. Secondly, Waltz rejects the idea that international phenomena can 
be reduced to state properties and interactions, and his project is based on the informed 
opinion that the analytical method is deficient in the study of international politicsxl. 
What is needed, then, is a systems theory that singles out the causes that are external to 
the system’s units. Theory should therefore distinguish between, on the one hand, states 
and their interactions, and on the other, the way wherein they are organized – the 
structure of their environment, the ‘international-political system’. It follows that 
causation cannot be reduced to factors that are specific to the system’s constituent parts 
or to their relations, such as psychological, economic, institutional, or ideological factors. 
Finally, since the structure of the system is the ‘locus of explanation’, the study of the 
‘international-political system’ cannot be moulded on the study of any other system 
whose structure does not share the same characteristics: in particular, ‘national-political 
systems’, which are hierarchical, not anarchical. 
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Important consequences follow from these basic points. Waltz’s first commitment 
to producing a truly scientific theory of international politics, similar in quality and 
legitimacy to those of the natural and economic sciences, sets his project against that of 
traditional political theory, which is ‘concerned more with philosophic interpretation than 
with theoretical explanation’xli. Like Morgenthau’s, traditional theory offers 
‘reductionist’ explanations where causation is reduced to a single psychological 
dimensionxlii, and theory made incapable of dealing with ‘regularities and repetitions’, 
which is its true rolexliii. Keeping in mind the need to protect IR’s autonomy as well as its 
status among other social sciences, Waltz’s contribution avoided the danger of scientism 
by rejecting the simplistic analogy with the natural world. It did not, however, prevent 
him from being viewed as a ‘positivist’ who is less concerned with the nature and 
implications of power politics than with formulating an elegant and value-free assessment 
of international constraints. When Richard Ashley criticized the ‘scientifically inscrutable 
ideological connotations’ of Neorealism’s central conceptsxliv, Waltz declared his critic to 
be incomprehensible, rejecting the criticism altogether as irrelevant. ‘Critical theory’ and 
‘problem-solving theory’, he claimed, are two separate endeavours guided by different 
objectives: while critical theory ‘seeks to interpret the world historically and 
philosophically’, problem-solving theory ‘seeks to understand and explain it’. Insofar as 
Waltz is interested in explaining international politics, there is, in Ashley’s criticism, ‘no 
clue about how to write an improved theory of the latter sort’xlv. 
Ashley and Waltz’s impossible dialogue embodies the symptomatic evolution of 
IR and its complex identity, and can hardly be qualified as a “debate”. Ashley’s 
assumptions are external to Waltz’s cognitive project, and there is no mutual ground for 
them to meet. As far as Waltz is concerned, the political, philosophical, social or properly 
ethical aspects of science are independent of the actual cognitive process, and the 
question of the scholar’s position or role is one that can be dealt with as a separate 
cognitive endeavour. Whatever the results of such an endeavour, it also does not 
challenge her scientific production as such, because the standards by which a theory is to 
be judged, evaluated, appreciated or depreciated, are those of utility and adequacy. 
Waltz’s epistemological stand thus leads him to rule out any simultaneous inquiry into 
the social and moral dimensions of either science or politics.  
 
From Value-Freedom to Value-Blindness: 
The Price of Positivism 
 
The fact that Waltz is not concerned with reflexivity does not mean that his theory 
is not capable of achieving it. To determine whether Ashley’s criticisms can be extended 
beyond Waltz’s intellectual posture, one needs to look further into his explanative 
scheme. This brings us to his principle concerning the ‘locus of explanation’. A recurrent 
question in IR literature concerns the accurate qualification of Waltz’s theory: is it truly 
“systemic” as he claims, or is it rather purely “structuralist”?xlvi In other words, does 
Waltz really offer us a theory that incorporates systemic and sub-systemic factors into 
one single causal sequence, or does he rather avoid the level of the units to fall in the 
opposite trap, by reducing all explanation to the effects of structure? While Waltz himself 
progressively stopped accentuating the “systemic” dimension of his contribution in 
favour of a structuralist explanationxlvii, the question remains. Indeed, the very conceptual 
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relevance and raison d’être of “structure” cannot be maintained without the existence of a 
given sub-systemic level having some properties, which, in the overall explanative 
scheme, are considered as ‘primary causes’xlviii. In fact, the main proposition according to 
which structure is meant to explain why, given primary causes, final effects are to be 
expected that are ‘disjoined’ from these causes, implies with logical necessity that 
something factual can be said about both causes and effects, something regarding their 
nature that can be observed objectively and measured. And it simultaneously implies that 
there is an objective way of determining and measuring whether they are indeed 
‘disjoined’ or not.  
On this point, Waltz’s propositions are somehow disappointing and in 
contradiction with his definitions, thereby possibly defeating his primary ‘systemic’ 
purpose. To put it simply, Waltz says that structure is conceptually needed to account for 
the discordance between causes that lie at the level of the states, and effects that appear at 
the international level. This discordance allegedly justifies why ‘inside-out’ or 
‘reductionist’ explanations are deficient, and consequently, why a systems theory is 
needed. A proper theory is expected to explain observed laws, and laws are correlations 
between causes and effects, of the type “if a, then b”xlix. To perform its task, a systems 
theory rests on the invention of a ‘theoretical notion’l, that is by definition non-factual 
and thus non-observable, while the independent and dependent variables of the 
correlation are observed, factual ones. Here, structural causation is said to explain an 
existing law, the formation of a balance of power in the international system, or rather, 
‘balancing’ understood as a state behaviour. If “structure” is needed, it is because of the 
discordance between the independent variables or causes – state motivations/intentions – 
and the observed effect – the balance of power; the constraints imposed on states by the 
structure of the international system resolve the contradiction. It appears then clear that 
both states’ motivations/intentions and the balance of power have to be objective, factual 
realities that can be measured and determined. However, Waltz never produces any 
reliable and rigorous propositions concerning either the nature of these elements, or of 
their “disjunction”. Drawing upon the microeconomic analogy, he thus ‘assume[s] that 
states seek to ensure their survival’li, simply because it would be nonsense to envisage the 
opposite. It seems that Waltz does not really need to say more about state motivations, at 
least nothing more tangible that could be presented through some facts of observation. Of 
course, his whole theory aims to show that it does not really matter what states or rulers 
want and believe in, or how they promote their status on the international scene, since 
this does not explain the outcome of their actions. As far as IR is concerned, states’ and 
rulers’ attributes are therefore not worth knowing, even those that mould perceptions and 
promotions of the “national interest”. In fact, Waltz would probably argue that these 
objects do not belong to international theory, but rather to political theory (a different 
ontology) or international philosophy (a different epistemology).  
Waltz’s balance-of-power theory thus appears to be the product of many 
commitments that can be understood in light of IR’s ‘third debate’, which was partly 
triggered by the emergence of new non-governmental international actors that challenged 
Realism’s state-centred approachlii, and by the return of economic and cultural 
approaches to international conflict and integration that challenged Realism’s focus on 
military power and its ‘balance-of-power’ paradigm. The reassessment of the relevance 
of “power” was also supported empirically by the ‘great’ powers’ inability to achieve 
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military success against actors that had hardly ever been taken seriously by IR theoryliii. 
Apart from the epistemological and ontological questions that were brought at the 
forefront of the discipline’s preoccupations, the debate also challenged the already 
weakened paradigmatic status of Realism and, by extension, the academic status of IR 
itselfliv. It is thus legitimate to ask whether Waltz’s theory does not greatly reflect the 
need to preserve IR from political and social theory, in an attempt to save what seems to 
constitute its exclusive subject-matter, the ‘international-political system’ defined by its 
unique ‘anarchical structure’. This could explain some of Waltz’s theoretical choices. His 
theory borrows from Realism enough to justify that states should still be considered the 
major actors of the international system, but turns its back on their behaviour to embrace 
systemism from the angle of the actors’ environment; while it denies the merits of 
scientism, it moulds itself on microeconomics, thereby denying the original and specific 
nature of its own subject-matter. And, in fact, this is probably where Waltz’s endeavour 
is truly peculiar: it is so firmly dedicated to making IR an autonomous, as well as a 
legitimate field, that it has completely separated IR’s object from the broader realm to 
which it belongs – politics. This is undoubtedly Waltz’s most unique characteristic. 
Because it stresses on the ‘analytical’ function of theory, his systems approach does not 
offer a global or unified understanding of ‘systems,’ not because it is exclusively 
interested in the international political system, but because it breaks – and hence 
practically denies – the ontological relation of such a system to any other social system, 
in particular, the ‘national-political’ one. The implicit consequence of this principle is 
Waltz’s boldest proposition, that our knowledge of “politics” is not relevant to our 
understanding of international affairs.  
It is interesting enough that Waltz chooses to qualify the ‘international-political 
system’ as a ‘pre-eminently political’ one, where ‘political’ seems to refer to the 
illegitimate use of force, which, taken in its most simplistic sense, is the antithesis of 
domestic politics where law supposedly reigns supremelv. His conception of the political 
is thus completely opposed to Morgenthau’s, because he is in search of a discriminating 
factor that would separate the two realms and bring forth the specific quality of the 
international system. But by adopting a formal criterion in lieu of a definition, Waltz 
reduces both politics and power to their material manifestations, thereby ignoring all 
other forms of social conflict present in both types of realms. In particular, he denies the 
significance of struggles for legitimacy and the imposition of norms, social truths, or 
ideological orientations, and hence considers both systems from an exclusively static 
perspective, a view that has the unfortunate consequence of being historically 
inaccuratelvi and ‘depoliticised’lvii, and of accepting – or even legitimating – existing 
national or international orderslviii. This position is set against that of his predecessor: by 
avoiding the philosophical discourse that permeates so heavily Morgenthau’s Realism, 
Waltz embraces a complete denial of the axiological dimension of politics in general, 
international politics in particular. His theory is a perfect model of value-free and 
judgment-free objective discourse, which not only rejects the need for some critical 
evaluation of social science, but also rejects ideas, values, and norms outside of IR’s 
subject-matter. The reflexive task is thus made impossible by the epistemological 
negation of valuation as a constitutive factor in the production of theory, the ontological 
vacuum in which values are placed, and the resulting impossibility of subjecting these 
facts to equal standards of objectification. 
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The comparison of Morgenthau’s and Waltz’s approaches to international politics 
suggests that whenever theory gains in scientific rigour, it loses on the terrain of 
judgment and evaluation, and vice versa. Historically, American IR has constantly had to 
make a choice between evaluative and objectivist theory. That the debate never 
impressed IR in a similar manner in the UK, Canada, or Francelix should be enough to 
posit that some factors specific to American institutional, intellectual or political 
conditions are responsible for the orientation reached by IR’s central producers. Although 
this lies without the scope of this article, it is worth hinting at, since the assumed 
American identity of IRlx suggests that no major epistemological “turn” would efficiently 
impact the discipline’s self-image unless brought from within, and that paradigmatic 
changes occurring at the periphery of its ‘self-imposed ghetto’lxi will continue to be 
selectively ‘imported’lxii to serve the agendas and preoccupations specifically shaping 
American social institutions. Conceptually, and more importantly, the full and 
meaningful elaboration of either theoretical orientation (philosophical or scientific) can 
only be achieved at the expense of the other’s purpose, and from this ideal-typical 
opposition arises the question of how theory can simultaneously embrace these different 
modes, in such a way that the concerns of critical theory are integrated to – or even made 
to mould and orient – the objectification of IR’s subject-matter. This article suggests that 
this can only be done if international theory considers the discourse on international 
politics as an integral part of its subject-matter, and is ready to drop the illusion that 
social science can ever be free from values and judgment, whether in its assumptions, its 
propositions, or the social significance of its discourse. We now turn to Kaplan’s 
theoretical framework to illustrate the realism of such an endeavour. 
 
Outline for a Reflexive Theory:  
Morton Kaplan’s Cognitive Project 
 
Kaplan’s System and Process in International Politicslxiii was for a whole decade 
after its publication the most quoted piece of work in the fieldlxiv, and its author was a 
major contributor to the heated ‘second debate’ that famously opposed IR’s ‘scientist’ 
and ‘traditionalist’ theorists. While its status of “classic” has recently been recognizedlxv, 
the philosophy of knowledge that supports and gives meaning to the author’s 
conceptualization of international politics may just as easily be ignored today by his 
contemporary audience as it was by his earliest onelxvi. A restatement of Kaplan’s main 
epistemological assumptions may help readers who are unfamiliar with his work 
understand both the underlying principles of his systems theory and the meaning of his 
project, while those who are more familiar with his contribution are invited to reconsider 
it from a new perspective, away from the terms and context of IR’s ‘second debate’. 
 
‘Systemic Pragmaticism’: 
Transcending the Postmodern Critique 
 
Kaplan’s theory of international politics is based on what he originally called 
‘systemic pragmaticism’lxvii, a philosophy of knowledge that rejects the notion of absolute 
objectivity and the subsequent dichotomy between knowledge and opinion. Against the 
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then-leading school of logical positivism, Kaplan applied the pragmatist (Peircean) 
understanding of ‘meaning’ to scientific ‘truth’, thereby rejecting the universality and 
univocality of empirical observations of both nature and society and embracing the 
situational and contextual nature of knowledge and scientific investigation.lxviii While 
acknowledging early on the validity of “post-modern” criticisms against the universal and 
objective status of science (scientism and positivism as assumed by most 
Behaviouralists), he nonetheless reached different conclusions, as he believed that 
science remains a significant intellectual and social activity, as long as one is ready to 
abandon the idea that there exists one world and one truth about it.  
Kaplan indeed agrees that absolute statements about the world are not possible. 
According to him, this is so for three interrelated reasons. Firstly, there is no particular 
faculty that allows men to identify, among all possible statements, those that are 
“necessarily true”, and there is therefore no absolute standard whereby different 
propositions can be a priori differentiated from one another. Knowledge should 
consequently be founded on an empirical assessment of realitylxix. Secondly, this 
assessment is not universal, for observation is subjected to its own contextuality. The 
classical theory of truth as correspondence, which relies on the notion of absolute ‘fit’, is 
therefore misleading, as it is oblivious to the fact that the logic of discovery/interpretation 
is not separable from the contextual meaning of any given observation at the time it is 
made/interpreted. Finally, the nature of scientific activity is bound to reflect or share the 
nature of its main medium – language; and since language is non-univocallxx, as well as 
historically and culturally determined, the validity of scientific statements can only be 
established in reference to the specific language-system in which they are conceived, 
formulated, and evaluated. The only way in which scientific “objectivity” can therefore 
have any possible and realist meaning is if science is embraced as a ‘transactional’ 
activity, in which given sets of propositions about the world can successfully be publicly 
communicated across subjectivities and across referential cognitive systems.  
Kaplan’s original concern was to salvage knowledge and science from the flaws 
of absolutism, while protecting them from the dangers of nihilism. His systems theory is 
then meant to serve just this purpose. To think in terms of systems is to avoid as much as 
possible essentialist definitions of man, society, or politics (Morgenthau) in favour of a 
relational one. What becomes an object of study are the interactions of units within a 
given system whose limits are conceptually set, and the mutual impact of environment 
and systems on each other based on the internal properties of both. The notion of systems 
is then meant to replace the triad of man, nation, and state by a unified conceptual 
framework allowing for uniform empirical testing. Kaplan’s systems approach also does 
not segregate the international system from other social systems (Waltz), because his 
classification of ‘social systems’ does not rest on their structure. Moreover, it includes 
the dynamic dimension of ‘process’: human and social systems in general, unlike 
‘physical’ ones, are ‘ultrastable homeostatic systems’ that have the ability to adapt to 
changes occurring in them and in their environment; when faced with major external 
changes, they are capable of restructuring themselves from within, whether at the 
physiological, or the cognitive, emotional, and moral level, but also to transform their 
environment to make it more viablelxxi. Actors have thus more options than ‘simple 
learning or behavioural adaptation’ as is the case in Waltz’s ‘self-help’ systemlxxii.  
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It is from the possibility of relating three different ‘multistable homeostatic 
systems’lxxiii that Kaplan’s approach emerges as one that can integrate values as objects of 
study as well as factors shaping cognition. These are the individual, social, and 
international systems. The following demonstration is based on an inquiry that was 
clearly identified by Kaplan, but remained secondary in his specific treatment of 
international politics. This inquiry is first concerned with values and their role in the 
functioning and regulation of human and social systems.  
 
Values as Facts: 
Kaplan’s Anti-Positivist Stand 
 
The first important proposition is that values in general – objectified as human 
‘valuations’, or what is ‘valuable’ for actors – are part of the subject-matter of systemic 
science, which is concerned with the processes whereby systems regulate themselves. 
The second is that values and valuations can be studied objectively, and are therefore not 
restricted to a purely philosophical, speculative, or normative discourse on reality: values 
can be cognitively assessed. According to Kaplan’s definition of “objectivity”, it is 
indeed possible for different observers to reach a common evaluation of human 
valuations, since one can measure empirically the content of individual evaluative 
propositions, and thereby test human axiological claims, at least by measuring the 
concordance between valuations and actions, then possibly by establishing a hierarchy of 
valuations showing individual preferences. Therefore, insofar as values can be subjected 
to objective, empirical testing, they have an ‘objective status’, are ‘real’lxxiv, and a 
discourse on values is consequently possible, meaningful, and informative in the 
Popperian sense. 
However, that values are ‘objective’ does not at all imply that they are universal, 
absolute, or immutable. On the contrary, human valuations are shaped by the processes 
human systems undergo just as they contribute to the regulatory operations of a given 
system. In that sense, values are both ‘objective’ – objectifiable – and ‘conditional’: they 
are not ‘relative in the sense of mere preferences’, but rather ‘related to the characteristics 
of man, his relationship to his environment, and his environment.’ ‘Moral analysis’ 
should therefore ‘respond to the nature of the subject matter’ and, insofar as ‘the subject 
matter is homeostatic’ in nature, such an analysis should be founded on an understanding 
of the processes whereby the human system functions, fulfils its needs, and regulates 
itself within its environment, but also an understanding of the nature, rules, and processes 
that govern the life of the environment itself lxxv. Kaplan’s main message here is that as 
long as we speak of “human nature” to account for individual and collective behaviour, 
nothing truly informative can be said about social facts. In order to break the tautological 
discourse that is produced by a priori definitions of human nature, we need to address 
individual or collective ideas, beliefs, and norms from a relational, dynamic perspective 
that would also enable us to test – and possibly revise – IR’s implicit views on how 
human biological needs shape social motivations and behaviourlxxvi. It is then nonsensical 
and illusory to treat values as objects endowed with a fixed, unchanging nature, and to 
address them without regard for what makes ‘judgment’ possible – the human ‘system of 
perception’. By leaving the ‘system of perception out of account’, absolutist approaches 
to values and ethics have ‘failed to understand that value-laden activity involves a 
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relationship among a perceiving instrument, an experiment, and a setting’lxxvii. Kaplan’s 
project is to re-establish the foundational, cognitive status of the contexts and processes 
that are necessarily involved in the production of valuations, and to relate the latter to the 
general processes of social life. 
When addressing systemic regulation at the level of human systems, Kaplan’s 
analysis rests on conceptual frameworks and empirical data provided by various 
disciplines concerned with human perception and behaviour, from psychoanalysis to the 
cognitive sciences. While he sketches his treatment of individual valuations in System 
and Process, it remains symptomatically marginal to that of political systems, and 
isolated from the text in an independent appendix (Appendix 2). One reason for the 
segregation of moral analysis from the analysis of international politics is the problem of 
transposing a methodology designed to address individual human systems and sub-
systems to the level of social organization. Another reason is related to the feasibility of 
such a general, empirical investigation, which is limited in two ways. First, because of the 
difficulty of implementing the test experiences that would objectively reveal the content 
and hierarchy of valuations. While it would be easy to test, say, whether an individual 
who claims to value the general interest more than his own really does, by observing his 
willingness to sacrifice the latter to the former, it would be much more complicated to 
measure all the valuations that account for individual behaviour, compare them, and 
follow changes affecting their meaning over time. Secondly, it is only by carrying out 
such experiences and assessing their results that Kaplan’s approach can demonstrate its 
relevance qua moral analysis. In other words, it is by showing empirically that values are 
indeed legitimate variables that are also affected by others that Kaplan’s assertions 
against essentialism can be established once and for all. A systems theory of international 
politics would therefore be dependent on the progress of other fields of inquiry, such as 
sociology, anthropology, or social psychology.  
Conceptually, Kaplan offers what is needed to critically reflect on the impact of 
valuations on theory: the acknowledgment of the cognitive status of (a discourse on) 
values, the identification of a conceptual framework that can successfully address them as 
scientific objects, and some primary theoretical notions that permit the conceptualization 
and implementation of test experiences. From here, two important orders of inquiry 
become possible and meaningful: through the study of social systems – in particular, 
national and international ones – it becomes possible to identify the place of values, 
valuations, perceptions, and evaluative claims of political actors, and to search for their 
status in the explanative scheme offered by systems theory; through the study of man 
taken both as a system and an actor in more complex social systems, it becomes possible 
to assess how valuations affect, and are affected by, cognitive processes understood as a 
form of interaction between the human individual system and the social – and natural – 
systems which represent simultaneously his objects of study, his objects of judgment, and 
his field of action. 
 
A Question for Social Science: 
Testing ‘Interdependent Utilities’ 
 
In an attempt to address values – justice in particular – from a systemic 
perspective, Kaplan offers one notion that deserves to be central in his analysis of social 
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interaction and regulation, that of ‘interdependent utility’. This concept aims to explain 
individual perceptions of, and preferences for, collective interests, against the 
propositions of classical utilitarian theorylxxviii, and therefore concerns the processes 
whereby collective interests become valuable for the individual. Starting from the 
empirical identification of basic human needs (biological and emotional), Kaplan posits 
that some inter-individual relations gain significance for the parties involved in them so 
as to become endowed with an intrinsic value that cannot be consciously reduced by 
individuals to their own personal interests, or else these relations would cease to exist (for 
example, marital love). One of the tasks of a systems theory is precisely to study – and 
test – ‘interdependent utilities’, by showing whether given collective institutions and 
interests indeed result from regulatory processes that serve individual stability and 
development. Such a test conceptually rests on the relation of variables specific 
respectively to the individual system and to those systems that constitute its environment. 
In particular, ‘interdependent utilities’ depend on the structure and functioning of the 
individuals’ biological and personality systems – manifested by their needs –, on those of 
the social systems to which individuals belong, and on the information that is processed 
by the latter in their interaction with their environmentlxxix. The ‘multistable’ nature of 
human beings thereby brings valuations into the dynamic dimension of systemic 
regulation, and forces us to take into account not the mere nature (Morgenthau) or 
structure (Waltz) of life, but the processes of existence as well. Another important 
sociological factor must then be considered, namely, the systemic position of a given 
agent, that is, the ‘role’ any individual occupies in a given system or, more realistically, 
in a multitude of different ones. According to Kaplan, it is this factor that ultimately 
accounts for differences in individual or collective valuations, since it is from a given 
position that any system assesses its needs, its environment, and its relation to the latter, 
while this position also determines the kind of information it receives, and how it 
processes them. 
When we move from the human to the political system, such a framework allows 
us to address the question of political “interest” in ways that promise to be less simplistic 
than what is traditionally proposed by Realist theories. By extending the ‘needs’ and 
regulatory processes of a system beyond the mere material dimension implied in such 
notions as “survival” or “power”, and by including ‘interdependent utilities’ as a 
fundamental element of human and social regulation, Kaplan opens up the possibility of 
including objects such as norms and values in the empirical study of national and 
international systems, with a greater rigour than the discipline’s “Idealist” precursors had 
envisaged. This study is not entirely achieved in System and Process, but can nonetheless 
be partially deduced from its main propositions and correlations, by artificially singling 
out valuations as part of the ‘variables’ and ‘parameters’ identified by the author in his 
study of the impact on the behaviour of given state-systems of five of the ‘six models’ of 
international system he envisagedlxxx. Some conclusions of such a reading concur with 
classical Realist claims, while others need greater conceptual and empirical explorations. 
Among these is the assertion that “democratic” regimes regulate themselves better in a 
politically and legally organized environment, while “autocratic” ones only make it at the 
expense of their individuals’ stability and regulation. While this proposition was 
politically meaningful in the context of the Cold War, it also has a global significance for 
human development, and entails important normative claims as well. 
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More importantly, and at another level of analysis, the notion of ‘interdependent 
utility’ is also pertinent to assess the role cognitive activities have on the regulation of 
human and social systems, and to answer the ultimate reflexive question: “what systems 
of thought – in form and content – best satisfy individual and collective regulatory 
needs?” Such an inquiry encompasses the philosophy and sociology of knowledge in its 
broadest scope, and includes the inquiry into not only the evolution of science per se, but 
also that of philosophy, art, and religion. Within Kaplan’s approach, it becomes feasible 
and meaningful to ask how given social systems have developed, and given preference 
for, given forms of knowledge; how individuals simultaneously adhere to different 
systems of thought, and how these multiple affiliations contribute to the regulation of 
their life and of their interaction with nature and society at the moral, emotional, and 
material levels. In other words, Kaplan’s systems approach rests on a reflexive 
epistemology that can lead to the formulation of some clear research programs, and can 
therefore contribute to an efficient objectification of individual and collective cognitive 
processes. 
 
Objectifying the Objectifying Subject: 
A Systemic Alternative 
 
Unlike Morgenthau’s and Waltz’s, Kaplan’s theoretical framework embraces the 
epistemic view that knowledge and judgment are interdependent human faculties that 
inform and shape each other, and consequently, that a social theory needs to transcend 
both a priori and positivist discourses on social reality, even at the expense of 
universality. In this epistemic posture lies the foundation of Kaplan’s reflexive thought, 
which needs to be explained further here. While Kaplan offers a theory in which 
individual and social regulation can be objectified and assessed, he does not 
systematically pursue the study of the most fundamental epistemological principle he 
shares with contemporary critical theorists, namely, the acknowledgment of the 
contextual nature of objective knowledge and the incorporation of valuations in the 
cognitive and social activity of science itself. To conceptualize and carry out such a 
study, two particular ‘multistable homeostatic systems’ would need to be objectified: the 
social scientist and, beyond him, the system to which he functionally belongs – Science. 
That the scholar and his science should be addressed as ‘systems of action’ and 
not as generic ‘types’ representing a differentiated kind of social action is a very 
important condition for a successful reflexive analysis of academic production. This 
approach is indeed very different from the Weberian typology adopted by Morgenthau: 
insofar as systems theory rejects any essentialist definition of human activity or absolute 
notions such as “man”, “truth”, or “science”, no a priori values can be meaningfully 
superimposed on a given activity, and no given social activity can a priori be defined in 
terms of values. To separate ‘scientific’ from ‘political man’ is simply pointless here, for 
this distinction does not in any way tell us how the former constructs his notion of ‘truth’, 
nor does it help us understand the actual relationship between science and politics – and 
hence between cognition and action – through history, i.e., the collective processes that 
govern or regulate the evolution of, and interaction between, these two fields of social 
production. 
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In opposition to the Weberian ideal-typical approach to scholarship, Kaplan’s 
systems theory allows for a critical reflection on the axiological dimension of theory 
understood as both an intellectual and a social product. Firstly, because it acknowledges 
the plural nature of scholarship at both the individual and collective levels, this plurality 
being a result of systemic conceptualization. Secondly, because it sets as the main source 
of this plurality the diversity of social environments, and the diversity of positions 
individual and collective systems of scholarship occupy in them. Once plurality and 
difference are recognized, it becomes meaningful, legitimate, but also necessary, to study 
the mutual impact of valuations and cognitive processes on each other, by addressing the 
scholar and the academic field qua systems, and taking into account the nature and 
structure of their respective sub-systems, those of their respective environments – such as 
the national and international ones – and the positions – or ‘roles’ – they hold in them. In 
other words, it becomes possible to pursue a sociology of academic production that is not 
independent or detached from political and international theory, and to incorporate this 
production in the ontology of a unified, reflexive theory of the social. 
Kaplan’s ‘systems theory’ is a possible candidate for such a unified reflexive 
framework because it is capable of identifying as cognitive problems those issues 
reflexivity is concerned with, and of defining these problems as equally “political” as the 
issues political and international theory considers itself exclusively concerned with. In 
other words, Kaplan’s approach unifies the subject-matter of IR’s objectivist theories 
with that of IR’s critical theories, which is precisely what reflexivity entails. Concretely, 
it is also capable of devising empirical means to assess both the regulatory role of 
cognitive discourse in the psychological, moral, and political development of given social 
systems, and the regulatory role of political discourse and action in the development of 
(specific forms and fields of) knowledge. The notion of ‘interdependent utility’ thereby 
enables us to ask – and operationalize – some fundamental reflexive research questions, 
by addressing the relationship between specific modes of thinking or cognitive ideologies 
and given public policies or political ideologies. In this way, the three ‘homeostatic 
multistable systems’ that are the individual, the social, and the international system can 
be related so as to reveal how valuations inform cognition and how knowledge informs 
evaluation. 
Because of his implicit idea that no meaningful “philosophical truths” can be 
revealed independently of an empirical investigation of social reality, and his consequent 
rejection of a priori principles, Kaplan provides a theoretical framework that makes 
possible an ‘objectification of the objectifying subject’ that embraces interdisciplinarity at 
the epistemic level and embraces the unity of the human condition at the ontological one. 
Through its unification of thought, judgment, and action, his approach stands as 
conceptually antagonistic to Morgenthau and Weber’s, for it denies the existence of a 
unique “type” of scholar motivated by a unique value – truth – and unequivocally 
distinguished from the ‘man of action’. It nonetheless serves both Morgenthau and 
Weber’s original preoccupation – to protect scholarship from the ideological tensions of 
social activity – by enabling the empirical identification of the actual dangers that 
confront scholars in their real social setting, and the many real situations and contexts 
presiding over the production of an institutionalized knowledge of world politics. It 
therefore offers a satisfactory alternative for all the scholars who are particularly 
concerned with the moral dimension of scholarship, as it gives empirical grounding to the 
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ethics of truth that they espouse. But more importantly, Kaplan’s model in fact provides a 
way out of the Weberian dilemma mentioned earlier: since absolute, universal knowledge 
is impossible and since theory itself is bound to reflect and bear the weight of actual 
relations of power, ‘scientific man’ can never really achieve the segregation that is 
required for him to confront with ‘truth’ ‘political’ man’s power-driven discourse, 
judgments, and actions; what scholarship can do is speak with a realistic reflexive voice 
that unites the scholar’s ‘ethics of truth’ with her ‘ethics of responsibility’ while being 
aware of, and constantly striving to reduce, its own limitations. Kaplan shares with 
critical theorists an ‘activist’ approach to knowledge – albeit not a specifically Marxian 
one – embracing the principle that the world cannot be changed unless it is understood, 
and that it cannot be understood unless the impact of existential reality on knowledge is 
empirically revealed. His philosophical attitude therefore produces a serious and 
workable model for those of us who wish to uphold this principle, because it satisfies the 
fundamental condition for any theory to be reflexive: the conceptualization of the 
epistemic interdependence between knowledge and judgment. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Among the many reflexive questions scholars may ask, the ultimate interrogation 
that concerns IR is the following: how is theory itself affected by the cultural, normative, 
and material characteristics of the international system, and the position of IR theorists 
within it? If empirical assessments of disciplinary production across cultural areas lead to 
the identification of structural factors that explain differences in cognitive assessments of 
world politics, then IR has to take these ‘geographies of knowledge of world politics’lxxxi 
into consideration and understand how they affect its own intellectual, social and moral 
status.  
This article shows that Kaplan’s systems theory, among other possible ones, 
allows for such a conceptualization of scientific production, for it attempts to objectify 
the processes governing mental and social regulation, which necessarily include the 
variables of time and space, and therefore makes room for history and culture as essential 
factors in the production of thought. It also shows that Kaplan’s model is successful 
because it satisfies three important conditions for the realisation of the reflexive task: the 
rejection of the epistemological dichotomy between subject and object, the rejection of 
the ontological dichotomy between facts and values, and the inclusion of values as 
empirical factors shaping both behaviour and cognition. For those theorists who are 
willing to ‘problematize’ the ‘relationship between the social world and the social 
construction of meaning’lxxxii and to address themselves as products as well as producers 
of a knowledge that is itself contextual, contextually purposeful, and political in essence, 
the “sociological” model needs to be embraced at the expense of both “philosophical”, a-
historical discourses on politics, and “scientific”, universalistic ones. As shown here, 
while the philosophical approach fails to unify its axiological and objectivist claims into a 
uniformly rigorous discourse on world affairs, the scientific position, in turn, fails to 
justify its axiological or normative claims because its epistemology is incapable of 
subjecting them to a common standard of validity.  
Beyond the intellectual challenge addressed here, these conclusions may be 
completed by institutional considerations as well. Indeed, whenever the scientific 
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approach is associated with the very identity – and survival – of IRlxxxiii, reflexivity will 
remain marginal and contested where it is most needed. The question of IR’s autonomy 
arises again. Critical theory calls not for an autonomy that intellectually and 
institutionally segregates IR from other social sciences, but one that discriminates it from 
other social fields, especially political oneslxxxiv. The concern for reflexivity thus 
challenges the meaning of many IR theories, by forcing us to reconsider the opposition 
between theory and meta-theory. For if it can be empirically established that the structure 
of international power relations causally affect IR theory as an intellectual and 
institutional production, then it necessarily follows that meta-theory, understood as the 
“discourse on IR theory”, becomes itself a “discourse on international politics”. 
Reflexivity would then be more than just a personal choice motivating research and 
occasionally challenging paradigmatic and discursive practices: it would have to be 
viewed as a necessary, built-in requirement of ‘normal science’.  
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